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Abstract
Whether power-sharing increases polarisation or not in post-conflict societies remains deeply 
contested. Yet, we currently lack an adequate conceptualisation of polarisation to assess the 
link (if any) between the two. This article offers a new conceptualisation of polarisation and 
uses this to gather evidence from Northern Ireland to argue that the assumption that power-
sharing entrenches polarisation is not the reality that many think it is. By examining legislator 
voting records, speeches by party leaders, manifestos and public opinion data, we disaggregate 
polarisation into different issues, track it over time, and examine both elite and mass levels. We 
find that overall polarisation declined, albeit some limited polarisation remained in cultural and 
identity issues, but these were of low salience. We argue that this is the result of parties using 
identity instrumentally for electoral distinction in a system of convergence – a process that is 
independent of the effects of power-sharing.
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Introduction
Whether power-sharing increases polarisation or not in post-conflict societies is of central 
importance to academics and mediators interested in managing and resolving conflict. 
The rise in the number of negotiated ends to civil wars that rely on some form of power-
sharing (Billingsbo, 2013) makes this debate particularly relevant today. Yet, studies of 
post-conflict societies lack an adequate conceptualisation of polarisation, which hinders 
gathering satisfactory evidence to assess the link, if any, between power-sharing and 
long-term polarisation. This article offers a new conceptualisation of polarisation in post-
conflict settings and applies this to gather evidence from the case of Northern Ireland to 
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argue that common assumptions that power-sharing entrenches polarisation is not the 
reality that many think it is.
Debates around power-sharing have been unable to move beyond whether it is a valu-
able tool in conflict transformation or whether it merely institutionalises rival identities 
that formed the basis of the conflict in the first place. For its supporters, power-sharing 
neutralises conflict by guaranteeing the inclusion of minority groups while still adhering 
to the principles of liberal democracy (McGarry and O’Leary, 2017). Power-sharing 
reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007); it incentivizes 
violent spoilers to transform into stakeholders (Walter, 2002); it promotes parity of 
esteem between competing groups (O’Leary, 1999); and, it encourages policy making 
that meets the needs of as many in society as possible and not just the majority (Lijphart, 
1969). What is more, when it comes to voting behaviour, it does not appear that power-
sharing inevitably leads to ethnic outbidding (Garry, 2016; Mitchell et al., 2009; Tilley 
et al., 2019).
In stark contrast, critics argue that whatever gains power-sharing appears to offer, 
these come at the long-term cost of embedding polarisation. From this perspective, 
power-sharing pits fractious identities against each other and prevents cross-cutting poli-
tics from emerging that could dampen violent rivalries (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Roeder 
and Rothchild, 2005; Tull and Mehler, 2005). By accommodating competing (usually 
ethnic) identities, power-sharing actually incentivizes leaders to appeal to citizens in eth-
nic terms and strengthens the hand of hardliners (Horowitz, 1985). Power-sharing is seen 
as creating a dynamic of outbidding by rivals in an attempt to gain electoral advantage, 
pulling parties to extreme positions (Lee, 2009). This dynamic is compounded by the 
nature of ‘involuntary coalition’, which insulates the executive from any effective opposi-
tion, thus creating a moral hazard for outbidding and polarisation (Taylor, 2006). Elite 
behaviour is seen as having a spill-over effect on mass attitudes and behaviours, which 
follow the lead set by elites (Zingher and Flynn, 2018).1
This long-standing debate has not been resolved due to the lack of an adequate con-
ceptualisation of polarisation in the post-conflict context. Existing understandings of 
polarisation do not allow us to examine if some policy areas are more likely to be polar-
ised than others, how rates of polarisation may change over time, nor distinguish 
between elite or mass polarisation. Instead, the term is often used in a catch-all way to 
indicate a sense of deep political tension between rivals, but this inhibits careful empiri-
cal measurement. Therefore, this article offers a new conceptualisation of polarisation 
and uses this to gather systematic evidence to answer the following questions: do divi-
sions between rival parties in a power-sharing system become entrenched over time or 
even increase? Does polarisation emerge in some policy areas but not others? Does 
designing a power-sharing system that accommodates particular identities prevent 
broader politics from emerging?
To tackle these questions, we use the case of Northern Ireland, whose mixed record 
under power-sharing makes it an ideal laboratory. This article challenges common 
assumptions that power-sharing has increased rates of polarisation and, in fact, on most 
measures it has declined. We find that polarisation is rare and when it happens it does not 
impact the functioning of the institutions. Although some distance remains between the 
parties in their electoral appeals around identity politics, this is not emphasised very much 
and certainly less than bread-and-butter politics. Instead of polarisation, we suggest that 
the parties are converging. There were also no indications of mass attitudinal or behav-
ioural polarisation. Occasionally, the parties emphasise identity politics for instrumental 
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reasons to distinguish themselves from rivals, but this appears largely independent of the 
power-sharing institutions.
Conceptualising Polarisation in Post-Conflict Societies
There are multiple understandings of power-sharing that range from the intuitive idea that 
it covers any instance of including opposition groups in joint national governments 
(Walter, 2002) through to formal understandings that stress particular institutional 
designs, like consociationalism (Lijphart, 1969). For this article, we follow Ottmann and 
Vüllers’ (2015) understanding of power-sharing as an arrangement between the govern-
ment of a state and a rebel group that promises to establish institutions that mandate joint 
control of power at the national level of government. We focus exclusively on political 
power-sharing (albeit Northern Ireland also included minor elements of power-sharing in 
bureaucracy and the police).
Very few studies of conflict define polarisation carefully, with the exception of Esteban 
and Ray (2008, 2012). Instead, to find more precise definitions, we need to turn to the 
wider political science and sociology literature. The core understanding of polarisation 
sees it as a bimodal distribution of preferences at either extreme with little common mid-
dle ground (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008). But polarisation is not just an end point and it can 
also refer to the process by which actors move towards the extremes and become more 
distant from each other (DiMaggio et al., 1996). To capture this distinction, Esteban and 
Ray (2012) refer to ‘polarization’ (bimodal clustering around the extremes) and ‘bipolari-
zation’ (the process of groups pulling away from each other, even if they never fully reach 
the extremes).
Existing understandings of polarisation embody three limitations when it comes to 
examining the fate of post-conflict societies. These limitations result in polarisation being 
used as a somewhat nebulous concept making it hard to be precise on whether it is fos-
tered by power-sharing or not.
First, most approaches tend to assume that society is either polarised as a whole or 
not. Implicit in these approaches is an assumption that there is a single over-arching 
dimension of polarisation. Existing studies may observe rigid ethnic blocks (Lemarchand, 
2006), certain groups overwhelmingly voting for particular parties (Guelke, 2012) or 
highly partisan electoral appeals (Jarstad, 2008), and then declare that whole society to 
be polarised, without drilling down to see what issues are more or less polarised than 
others. In reality, political actors may be radical in some issue areas, but not in others 
(Whiting, 2018a). In a post-conflict society, it is easy to imagine a cross-cutting socio-
economic cleavage that displays no polarisation while an identity cleavage displays high 
polarisation. In short, any understanding of polarisation needs to see this as a multi-
dimensional concept.
Second, measures of polarisation are often static and look only at snapshots of polari-
sation. Societies are often identified as either being polarised or not retrospectively, usu-
ally proven by the fact that tension or violence has broken out (e.g. Lemarchand, 2006 on 
the Great Lakes region). Admittedly, there is a small number of exceptions that trace 
changing rates of polarisation over time, notably the work of Poole and Rosenthal (1997), 
but this is not usually applied in the post-conflict context. Yet, polarisation is a dynamic 
process, as captured Esteban and Ray’s (2008) notion of bipolarisation, and the spatial 
distance between rivals may expand and contract over time. Therefore, a temporal dimen-
sion is necessary for understanding polarisation.
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Third, existing understandings tend to look at either elite polarisation or mass polarisa-
tion, but rarely both. Instead, it is typically assumed that there is a relationship between 
the two, with either elites following the will of the masses or, more often, elite behaviour 
setting an example which the masses follow (Barber and McCarty, 2015). Indeed, many 
of the critiques and defences of power-sharing look only at the elite level and implicitly 
assume that post-conflict societies should be appraised solely or primarily by what is hap-
pening within elites. Given this often exclusively elite focus, it is necessary to bring back 
in the level of mass polarisation too.
To overcome these limitations, we conceptualise polarisation as multidimensional and 
seek to disaggregate competition into different issue areas to see which are more or less 
polarised. We conceive of polarisation as a longitudinal process and seek measures that 
can track the dynamic nature of this process. Finally, we think of polarisation as operating 
at two levels (elite and mass), which may or may not be connected, but both of which 
need to be examined.
The Case of Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland is one case of a broader universe of internal conflicts brought to a nego-
tiated end in the post–Cold War period through power-sharing. The diverse array of cases 
makes it futile to identify a ‘typical’ or ‘representative’ case – the commonalities between 
Bosnia, Burundi, Iraq, Lebanon and Northern Ireland (among others) are hard to find. 
Instead, it is preferable to look for influential cases that provide privileged insights into 
an empirical puzzle. Given Northern Ireland’s framing as a model for others to follow, it 
can serve an important ‘pathway case’ (Gerring, 2007) for these debates.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is the United Kingdom’s longest standing and deepest 
example of polarisation. While a full overview of the conflict is beyond our scope (see 
English, 2003), the key point for this analysis is the remarkable depth of polarisation 
throughout the conflict. Beginning in 1969, a violent conflict was waged between Irish 
republicans (Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA)) fighting to force Britain out 
of Northern Ireland and the British army and British loyalists (most notably the Ulster 
Volunteer Force) seeking to remain in the United Kingdom. This resulted in over 3000 
deaths and more than 50,000 injuries. From the Irish nationalist perspective, since its 
foundation in 1921, Northern Ireland was deliberately designed to ensure and favour a 
Protestant majority at the expense of a Catholic minority, with high levels of discrimina-
tion in public sector employment and public housing (Farrell, 1990; Whyte, 1983). There 
was deep segregation in the labour market, neighbourhoods were segregated, education 
and civil society were separate for the two communities, and there were very low rates of 
inter-community marriage. This was the baseline level of polarisation for when the con-
flict eventually came to an end.
The conflict ended following an IRA ceasefire in 1994 (interrupted briefly in 1996–
1997) and a subsequent power-sharing deal in 1998. The 1998 Belfast Agreement institu-
tionalised a form of consociational power-sharing (O’Leary, 1999). It established a 
devolved Northern Ireland Assembly using Proportional Representation–Single 
Transferable Vote (PR-STV) – a variant of Lijphart’s recommended use of closed list PR. 
Upon election to the Assembly, members are asked to declare themselves as ‘nationalist’ 
(Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)), ‘unionist’ (Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)), or ‘other’ (Alliance Party).2 
These designations are then used to give both communities veto power over potentially 
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divisive legislation. Electoral competition is within each block rather than between 
blocks, with Catholics and Protestants overwhelmingly voting only for nationalist or 
unionist parties, respectively (Garry, 2016). Under the peace deal, Northern Ireland 
remained part of the United Kingdom, but it included the provision for a possible refer-
endum to decide whether to remain in the United Kingdom or to reunify with Ireland, 
with both Britain and Ireland agreeing to facilitate the outcome of any such poll.
After 20 years, the record of power-sharing is mixed. Violence has been eliminated and 
the IRA is in a permanent state of retirement, albeit some minor violence remains – 14 
people were killed in the 5 years between 2013 and 2018 (Nolan, 2018). Former spoilers 
turned into stakeholders and all the main parties now work through the power-sharing 
institutions, including the DUP who initially rejected the deal until it endorsed the St 
Andrews Agreement in 2006/2007. There have been productive periods between the par-
ties, both in terms of volume of legislation passed and positive inter-personal relation-
ships, notably between 2007 and 2011. Famously, the DUP’s leader Ian Paisley, who once 
declared of Sinn Féin ‘I am not going to sit down with bloodthirsty monsters who have 
been killing and terrifying my people’, and former IRA commander Martin McGuinness 
developed such a positive working relationship as co-leaders of the Executive they were 
christened the ‘Chuckle Brothers’ in the media.
But politics in the region remains a challenge. In its first decade, power-sharing was 
suspended four times (twice for 24 hours, once for 3 months, and once for 5 years). Politics 
can get bogged down by clashes over identity issues, especially parades, flags, support for 
the Irish language, and how to deal with the past. Over the last 5 years, the Assembly led 
a precarious existence and it came as little surprise when it eventually collapsed in January 
2017 for 3 years. The catalyst for the collapse was the mismanagement of a renewable 
heating policy by the DUP, but this came on top of the previous years’ simmering tensions 
around identity politics. However, others have argued that the Assembly actually per-
formed some functions fairly well despite experiencing stalemate (Huaghey, 2019).
Academic debates over power-sharing in Northern Ireland have been almost as divided as 
the region itself. Its proponents point to a decline in violence, argue it achieved a break-
through where other initiatives failed and highlight how it restored legitimacy to a weak 
political entity (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004). Other supporters have pointed out that power-
sharing has not prevented additional policy dimensions from emerging or led to outbidding 
(Garry et al., 2017; Mitchel et al., 2009). Murtagh (2015) has found some convergence in 
public attitudes under power-sharing and cross-party convergence on non-ethnic policies. 
Hayward and McManus (2018) note that the largest proportion in the electorate today are 
those who do not identify themselves as either nationalist or unionist and this trend stands in 
contrast to dominant narratives of a ‘culture war’ under power-sharing.
Yet, critics maintain that power-sharing, and the way it was brought about, under-
mined mass support for the new political system generally by institutionalising lying and 
political manipulation (Aughey, 2002; Dixon, 2008) and entrenching community divides 
(Taylor, 2006). It is seen as rewarding the historically ‘extreme’ parties of the DUP and 
Sinn Féin at the expense of the moderate UUP and SDLP. It was also seen as marginalis-
ing the ‘other’ grouping (albeit the Alliance Party and others have seen an electoral surge 
over the last 3 years – see Figure 1). It has also been blamed for low levels of ‘bread and 
butter’ politics (Nolan, 2013). Even those who are not explicit critics of power-sharing 
have found that it can have detrimental consequences – Sinn Féin has used the legacy of 
the past and the divided politics of memorialisation as a way to gain political power and 
influence (McDowell, 2007). As a result, some have gone so far as to suggest that any 
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gains have come about despite power-sharing rather than because of it (Wilford, 2010). It 
is to evaluate these competing debates that we now turn.
Findings
Political Issues Under Power-Sharing
The Northern Irish experience defies claims that power-sharing entrenches identity poli-
tics at the expense of ‘bread-and-butter’ politics. All votes in the Northern Irish Assembly 
for a 20-year period until 2018 were coded into issue areas – a total of 810 votes. This is 
a relatively small amount, but it is worth remembering that the Assembly was suspended 
for 5 years (2002–2006), did not function for 3 years (2017–2020), and a number of poli-
cies are reserved by Westminster, such as macro-economic policy, most taxation and for-
eign policy. For coding, the full legislation was read by two researchers independently 
and the initial Assembly debate around the legislation was reviewed, and discrepancies 
were reconciled through discussion (see Supplemental Appendix for details). Of course, 
some may claim that all issues in a deeply divided society are underpinned by identity 
politics, even if they may not initially appear so. It is easy to imagine, for example, educa-
tion legislation quickly getting wrapped up into arguments over whether a curriculum 
favours one side more than another. Therefore, if initially non-identity-based legislation 
became embroiled in identity-based issues, then it was coded as identity-based politics.
These results are displayed in Table 1. This shows that votes on issues related to ‘Peace 
and Conflict, Identity Issues and Cultural Politics’ accounted for 20.4% of all legislative 
votes. Unsurprisingly, this was higher in the early years until 2010 (and particularly high 
in 2002 immediately prior to the Assembly’s 5-year collapse), but since 2011 has typi-
cally been in the teens (2017 is an anomaly due to only holding three votes that year). This 
did not prevent issues related to ‘Welfare and Quality of Life’ (23.7%), the ‘Economy’ 
(12.7%), ‘Justice Policy’ (8.1%) or ‘Miscellaneous’ issues (13.2%) being addressed.
This only covers issues that made it to the voting stage in the Assembly and it is pos-
sible that identity-based politics never make it this far, thus underestimating its salience. 
Therefore, we also undertook content analysis of the manifestos of the main political 
parties (see Supplemental Appendix for full coding details). We coded manifestos for all 
Assembly elections (1998, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2016), except for 2017. This year was 
excluded because there was an election the previous year and three of the main parties 
produced very short manifestos just reiterating or referring to the previous manifesto.
Manifestos show the same pattern as legislative voting. As a proportion of all issues 
covered, issues related to ‘Peace and the Peace Process’ and ‘Cultural Politics and Identity 
Promotion’ declined for all parties while issues related to the ‘Economy’ and ‘Welfare and 
Quality of Life’ were the most salient (see Figure 2). This trend is most stark for the his-
torically ‘extreme’ parties. For Sinn Féin, issues related to the peace process and cultural 
politics covered almost 40% of its manifesto in 1998, falling to a low of 18% in 2011 and 
then 24% in 2016. The most dramatic decline has come from the DUP, who went from a 
high of almost 50% in 1998 to 13% by 2016, with the turning point coming from 2007 
onwards once the party accepted the peace process.
Elite Behavioural Polarisation
In order to examine if legislators undergo bipolarisation or become polarised, we applied 
the DW-Nominate (Dynamic-Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation) scaling method 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 Political Studies 00(0)
of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) to all votes in the Assembly. Using legislators’ voting 
records, we calculated the ideal point of each legislator in a two-dimensional space and 
tracked legislators across successive parliaments to see if the distance between members 
of different parties increased or decreased.
Some caveats are worth noting about this method for measuring polarisation. The pri-
mary dimension, or the one that explains most of the variation in legislator voting, gener-
ally captures inter-party conflict. Individual legislators’ positions on these scales reflect a 
mix of ideological positioning and constituency interest as well as party loyalty and dis-
cipline, but it is contested as to how much the scale reflects each of these different inter-
ests. For example, Lee (2009) claims it is primarily a measure of partisanship while Poole 
(2007) claims that it is about ideology.
To date there have been five parliaments in Northern Ireland since power-sharing was 
introduced. However, the second parliament was suspended for 5 years after just 10 votes 
due to an unwillingness by unionists to share power with Sinn Féin in light of a failure by 
the IRA to disarm. Therefore, we only include the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Assemblies for the W-Nominate analysis (cross-sectional analyses of each parliament), 
but all Assemblies are included in the DW-Nominate analysis (which tracks over time).
The results are shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. Table 2 shows that the overwhelming 
amount of legislator behaviour can be explained by just one dimension (90% or higher, 
except for the Third Assembly where it was 88%). The second dimension only explains 
an additional 2%–9% of voting behaviour. This is not distinctive to Northern Ireland; Hix 
et al. (2006: 498) report a similar picture in the EU Parliament, US Congress and Senate, 
and the UN General Assembly. Although the method does not tell us what constitutes 
these dimensions, previous research strongly indicates that the primary dimension in 
Northern Ireland is, unsurprisingly, a nationalist-unionist divide while the secondary 
dimension is an economic left-right (a dimension that is stronger within the unionist com-
munity than the nationalist one) (Evans and Duffy, 1997).
Figure 3 shows the changing positions of the parties for each successive Assembly – 
each symbol represents the ideal point of one individual legislator based on an aggregate 
of all their votes in that Assembly. It shows that all parties became a lot more cohesive 
over time and individual legislators within each party begin to vote much more as a tight 
block. Figure 3 also shows the spatial distance between the parties and how this changed 
along two dimensions. At a glance, this demonstrates that the only time that full polarisa-
tion set in was in the Fourth Assembly between Sinn Féin and the DUP on the first dimen-
sion, but with simultaneous convergence on the second dimension. In the other Assemblies, 
we generally see the parties move towards each other on the first dimension while the 
pattern is somewhat more variable on the second dimension but without great distances 
ever emerging.
This can be more easily seen in Figures 4 and 5, which show the distance between the 
average position of each party’s legislators across the Assemblies on the first and second 
dimension, respectively. The scale ranges from –1 to +1 so the maximum possible distance 
between parties is a score of 2. Figure 4 shows that initially the main distance was between 
the unionist DUP (who rejected the peace deal) and all other parties (who agreed to the 
peace deal). After this starting point, there was a general convergence before full polarisa-
tion in the Fourth Assembly and a return to convergence in the Fifth Assembly. Yet, the 
Fourth Assembly was the most productive in terms of volume of legislation passed, while 
the Fifth Assembly collapsed despite clear convergence, indicating that there is no clear link 
between polarisation and performance. Figure 5 shows that on the weaker second 
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Social Democratic and Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Figure 3. W-Nominate analysis of legislator voting.













No. of roll-call votes 80 225 446 49
No. of roll-call votes that 
could not be analysed
1 0 2 0
No. of members of local 
assembly (MLAs)
111 121 109 108
No of MLAs who could not 
be analysed
8 2 1 6
Total vote decisions analysed 5557 17,560 34,715 4074
Percent of vote decisions 
classified correctly by a one-
dimensional model
95.3 88.08 90.78 94.38
Percent of vote decisions 
classified correctly by a two-
dimensional model
97.91 97.89 96.24 97.91
Notes: The Second Assembly (2002–2007) could not be calculated as it only entailed 10 votes before being 
suspended in October 2002.

















































































































































































14 Political Studies 00(0)
dimension the pattern was more variable. Again, this is indicative that this dimension is not 
the ethno-national divide, but one that cuts across this divide. Another finding of note is that 
rates of polarisation within each block are almost as great as the rates between each block, 
especially for the unionist parties. In the First Assembly, the space between the UUP and the 
DUP was as great as the space between the DUP and Sinn Féin.
Overall, the Northern Irish Assembly has only been polarised once (during the Fourth 
Assembly). This was driven by Sinn Féin and the DUP and it relates to one dimension 
only (presumably a nationalist-unionist one), albeit this is by far the most significant 
dimension of party competition. What is more, rates of nationalist-unionist polarisation 
did not predict the overall functioning of the Assembly.
Manifesto Polarisation
Legislator behaviour only looks at how party members behave when an issue makes it to an 
Assembly vote. It is also important to examine the positions parties take when making more 
general appeals on a full array of issues. For that reason, we also examined manifestos. 
Although very few voters read even part of a manifesto let alone the whole thing, manifes-
tos provide insights into the broad spectrum of policy positions a party adopts (Laver and 
Garry, 2000). What is more, because they are produced by all parties at regular intervals in 
a similar format, manifestos are an invaluable tool for comparison both across parties and 
over time. We examined all manifestos of the main parties in every Assembly election from 
1998 to 2016 (five elections). Manifesto data was used in two ways: to give a measure of 
policy position and to indicate how salient a policy was to a party. We then judged the dis-
tance between different parties’ policy positions on multiple issues to estimate the degree to 
which they were polarised or not over time.
We followed the coding method of the Comparative Manifesto Project, but with two 
additional categories for Northern Ireland’s post-conflict context: ‘Conflict, Peace and 
the Peace Process’ and ‘Identity and Cultural Politics’ (see Supplemental Appendix). In 
order to create comparable scales across parties and over time, we followed the method 
of Lowe et al. (2011). This combines different individual issues to create overarching 
latent categories (e.g. a ‘general left-right’ category is a combination of responses cover-
ing economic policy, welfare redistribution, government planning, and moral policy). We 
also followed their method for producing scales to see how important a policy is relative 
to other issues in the manifesto.
Figure 6 presents the policy positions of the parties across five overarching categories. 
This shows convergence between parties on socio-economic issues in a left-of-centre 
position, convergence on issues related to the peace process, but ongoing polarisation on 
identity issues.
In the general left-right scale, all parties were left of centre, but with the DUP initially 
somewhat more centrist before moving left by 2016 – a position which all parties ended up 
on except for Sinn Féin who pulled slightly further left. However, even then, the spatial 
distance is not that great. Similarly, all parties saw a clear role for the government in pro-
viding welfare services. Other socio-economic scales (not depicted here due to space limi-
tations) showed a similar picture of an overall left-of-centre party system, albeit with small 
divergences but all parties remaining on the left and more characterised by convergence.
Looking at the ‘Peace and Peace Process’ scale, this depicts how supportive parties are 
of the peace process and how much they advocate political accommodation with rivals or 
whether they focus on the problems or drawbacks related to the peace process (higher 
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numbers imply greater support, lower numbers greater criticism). Initially, the highest 
levels of support were within the nationalist parties and lowest levels of support within 
the unionist parties, before all parties converged on a neutral position by 2016, apart from 
the DUP who become more critical. This did not necessarily reflect a falling away of sup-
port for the peace process but instead showed its declining importance to the parties after 
20 years (see Figure 7). If anything, this implies decreased polarisation amid declining 
salience.
When it comes to policies related to the promotion of a particular identity or the 
rightful constitutional status of Northern Ireland, there remains significant polarisation 
(higher numbers represent a unionist position while lower numbers represent a nation-
alist one). The dimension ‘Culture and Identity’ showed clear and consistent polarisa-
tion between the unionist and nationalist blocks. There was also evidence of the 
historically more moderate parties on both the unionist (UUP) and nationalist (SDLP) 
sides moving towards the edges of the political space over time. This may indicate 
some outbidding, with moderate parties seeking to use cultural policies to harden their 
position in response to declining vote shares (see our discussion). ‘Constitutional 
Status’ examines parties’ positions on whether there should be a united Ireland or 
whether there should be closer ties to Britain. Unsurprisingly given these issues are the 
raison d’être of these parties, there was clear polarisation here too. Yet, this should not 
mask the fact there was also movement on this issue. Sinn Féin moderated their stance 
over time and, while still clearly in a nationalist position, shifted away from the 
extremes. The UUP briefly moderated its stance significantly before returning to a sol-
idly unionist position in 2016. Other conflict-related and identity-based issues were 
also examined, including ‘policing reform’, ‘parades, flags and symbols’, and ‘amnes-
ties’. While these displayed instances of polarisation, there were very few mentions of 
these in the manifestos at all.
Indeed, this is perhaps the real aspect of this analysis that is of interest – while cultural 
politics remained polarised, this was of less importance to all parties compared to bread-
and-butter politics and issues like the environment. The importance of various dimen-
sions for the parties in terms of how much this was emphasised in a manifesto relative to 
other issues is displayed in Figure 7, where higher numbers imply greater importance. 
Even those identity issues that according to the media are very high profile (parades, 
flags) were actually barely mentioned by any party.
Rhetorical Polarisation in Appeals to Grassroots
We also examined if polarisation was evident in the rhetorical appeals of party elites to 
their most committed supporters – party members at annual conferences. Language is an 
important component of political conflict and the words a political actor uses reflect 
underlying policy preferences and ideological positions. Thus, changes in the use of 
words relative to other actors can be used to estimate both bipolarisation and polarisation, 
provided an appropriate set of documents is selected for analysis. Even while acknowl-
edging the importance of words as a form of data, a number of scholars have pointed out 
potential limitations to word-based content analysis. It has been argued that some speeches 
matter more than others in revealing underlying ideological positioning (Grimmer and 
Stewart, 2013), and that including irrelevant words may underestimate policy divergence 
as may the inclusion of extremely rare words that come up very infrequently (Lowe, 
2008) – potential problems we seek to overcome in our analysis.
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Using the ‘wordscores’ method (see Laver et al., 2003 and Supplemental Appendix), 
we examined all party conference speeches by leaders of the five main parties from 1994 
to 2018 to look at the changing ideological positions of the party leadership. These were 
plotted on a scale running from –1 to +1, allowing us to estimate changes in distance 
from each other over time. A limitation of this method is that it aggregates words into 
one dimension when, as we argue, polarisation should be measured on multiple dimen-
sions. However, this can provide important data over time, meeting our other key criteria 
of examining the temporal aspect of polarisation. Therefore, provided it is examined in 
conjunction with other multidimensional measures, it can provide valuable insights. To 
avoid the limitations mentioned earlier, we focused on speeches by leaders to confer-
ences, which only the most cynical of observers would claim are non-ideological. We 
ensured we had a large ‘dictionary’ to compare words against by combining speeches by 
leaders of the five main parties between 1994 and 1997 (4 years prior to power-sharing). 
We removed all ‘stop words’ to reduce possible distortions from meaningless words and 
we followed the generally preferred MV method of rescaling (Martin and Vanberg, 
2008). Wordscores also had good face validity in this context, as shown by the fact that 
it reflected wider developments within Northern Irish politics.
Figure 8 shows the changing policy position of leadership speeches over time and their 
ideological distance from each other. The shaded areas are times when the Assembly was 
suspended. What is immediately clear is a consistent trend towards convergence by all 
parties and a reduction in distance between even the ‘extreme’ parties of the DUP and 
Sinn Féin. There are moments where some parties pull away from each other, but these 
are soon countered by a stronger converging trend. For example, in the negotiating days 
between 1994 and 1998, when the DUP refused to recognise any potential deal, it was 
moving away from its UUP rivals; in 2002, when the Assembly collapsed due to the IRA’s 
unwillingness to decommission its weapons, Sinn Féin pulled away slightly from the 
other parties; in 2007, the DUP pulled away just as it agreed to accept the peace deal and 
the Assembly was restored – most likely as the DUP took steps to maintain its ‘hardline’ 
image even while in reality compromising. But in all such instances the parties soon 
returned to the overall pattern of convergence.
Mass Polarisation
The picture at the mass level is similar to that at the elite level. When it comes to public 
opinion, there is no polarisation between Catholics and Protestants on socio-economic 
issues. Furthermore, cleavages on moral issues such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender (LGBT) rights or abortion are determined by age rather than ethno-national 
group. When it comes to attitudes towards the constitutional status of Northern Ireland 
and ethnic identities, polarisation remains. However, on attitudes towards symbolic poli-
tics, like the display of flags and partisan parades, there is less division between the 
groups. Behavioural indicators also show a decline in polarisation and a society that is not 
completely determined by an ethno-national cleavage.
To measure mass attitudes, we drew on the annually administered Northern Ireland 
Life and Times (NILT) Survey. Unfortunately, coverage can be a patchy as many ques-
tions tend to change or be dropped from year to year, depending on what is topical. 
Nonetheless, some key questions were consistently asked. In general, we sought to look 
at the extent to which attitudes aligned with clear partisan positions (Fiorina and Abrams, 
2008) and then looked at the attitudinal distance between nationalists and unionists.
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Turning first to attitudes towards socio-economic issues, we produced an ideological 
consistency scale (Abramowitz, 2010) based on six questions (these were only asked 
between 1998 and 2006 – see Supplemental Appendix). Figure 9 shows the percentage of 
the population classified as consistently economically left or right, disaggregated by 
nationalists and unionists. This shows that a person is not more likely to be left or right 
based on their ethno-national identity, that there is no real distance between these groups 
and that the rates for these groups did not change significantly over time. The mean score 
for unionists on this scale (lower scores were more economically left, higher scores more 
economically right) went from –2.5 in 1998 to –1.95 in 2006 with standard deviations of 
3.27 and 2.84, respectively, indicating that this cohort did not get substantially more dis-
persed or spread out over time. While nationalists were slightly more left-wing, going 
from a mean of –3.06 in 1998 to a mean of –3.1 in 2006, their standard deviations also 
remained largely the same at a size of 3.15 and 3.04. The bimodality coefficient did not 
go above 0.36 during this time frame (a number between 1 and 0 where a coefficient 
greater than 0.56 would indicate a bimodal distribution (Lelkes, 2016)) and the overlap 
coefficient (a number between 1 and 0 where 1 indicates perfect overlap between the two 
groups) was consistently above 0.825.
How respondents think of their national identity has long been polarised in Northern 
Ireland; however, there is little polarisation when it comes to symbolic politics. Protestants 
overwhelmingly identify as British (67% in 1998; 63% in 2018); Catholics overwhelm-
ingly identify as Irish (65% in 1998; 64% in 2018); while less than 5% of Protestants 
identified as Irish or Catholics as British in 2018. Yet, when respondents were asked 
whether they were annoyed by republican murals, kerb paintings or flags, 78% of 
Catholics and 61% of Protestants were not annoyed in 2004. These numbers stayed con-
sistently high and by 2018 this had risen to 85% of Catholics and 66% of Protestants. The 
same pattern held for loyalist murals, kerb paintings or flags. In 2004, 62% of Catholics 
and 66% of Protestants were not annoyed by these, and by 2018, this was 67% and 72%, 
respectively. When respondents were asked whether they would mind if a close relative 
were to marry someone of a different religion, in 2014, 79% of Catholics and 60% of 
Protestants would not mind. By 2018, this had risen to 90% of Catholics and 81% of 
Protestants. There are also issues that have always cut across the sectarian divide, espe-
cially moral issues. These are determined by age than religion, showing that other non-
ethnic cleavages are also evident. Attitudes to abortion and LGBT+ issues are the obvious 
examples here (Thomson, 2016).
In terms of mass behaviour, it is useful to look at voting behaviour, which shows that 
ethnic voting has not become locked in place. In 2007, 76% of Catholics felt closest to 
Sinn Féin or the SDLP while 24% chose an ‘other’ or no party, while 71% of Protestants 
felt closest to DUP or UUP. By 2018, only 49% of Catholics felt closest to Sinn Féin or the 
SDLP and only 50% of Protestants felt closest to the DUP or UUP. This was reflected in 
voting patterns too. Figure 1 shows all elections in Northern Ireland since 1998, showing 
a decline in the combined vote share of ethnic parties from 94% in 1998 to 76% by 2018, 
and a corresponding rise in ‘Others’ in their stead. Finally, turnout has generally been 
declining across almost all elections since 1998. These non-voters tend feel less close to 
the ethnic parties than their voting counterparts, highlighting that the ethnic tribune system 
has even less of a hold on this cohort. What is more, it does not appear to be the features of 
the consociational system itself that puts these respondents off voting (Garry, 2016).
One final proxy of polarising mass behaviour is rates of sectarian incidents and crimes. 
These have fallen dramatically since 2005/2006 when the recording began. In 2005/2006, 
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there were 1701 sectarian incidents and 1469 sectarian crimes. By 2018/2019, there were 
865 sectarian incidents and 622 crimes, almost a 50% reduction in incidents and 60% 
reduction in crimes.
Discussion
The findings can be summarised as follows: power-sharing did not prevent non-ethnic 
politics from emerging; elite polarisation is rare and when it happened it was not correlated 
with the collapse of the institutions; bipolarisation was limited, always short in duration 
and eclipsed by a stronger trend towards convergence; mass polarisation was not evident 
on either attitudinal or behavioural measures. While some polarisation remained between 
the parties in their electoral appeals around identity politics, this was not emphasised very 
much. Without wanting to dismiss the importance of these policies, these occurred within 
an overall context of lower salience than bread-and-butter issues. In other words, power-
sharing did not result in the detrimental consequences that its critics would predict.
Alternative Possible Explanations
One potential criticism is that an alternative interpretation of our findings may be possible 
that still sees power-sharing as causing polarisation. It may be suggested that power-
sharing causes polarisation, but it is not visible in our findings because there is some more 
powerful force at play that is counteracting power-sharing and creating centripetal incen-
tives. However, the other forces that the literature typically sees as causing centripetalism 
are either absent in Northern Ireland or have not had an impact.
A common assumption is that increased contact with individuals from different back-
grounds in everyday situations reduces divisions and increases tolerance (Niens et al., 
2003; Pettigrew, 1997). For example, there has been a notable reduction in segregation in 
the labour market (except for the security sector where Catholics remain under-repre-
sented), and a decline in the number of wards where more than 80% of the population is 
of the same religion (Grey et al., 2018). There has also been a decline in segregation in 
owner-occupied and private rented housing driven by an increase in the size of the 
Catholic middle class; however, public housing remains highly segregated (Grey et al., 
2018). Yet, even these limited indicators of less segregation have not translated into 
meaningful contact and ‘when contact happens it is characterised by politeness and avoid-
ance of any acknowledged difference’ rather than an effort to engage (Hayes and 
McAllister, 2015 [2013]: 152). Education remains highly segregated with little integrated 
education, even if there has been a rise in shared education between separate Catholic and 
Protestant schools (Grey et al., 2018). The percentage of Catholics and Protestants mar-
ried to someone of the same religion remained less than 15% throughout the post-conflict 
period and usually closer to 10% (Hayes and McAllister, 2015 [2013]; NILT, 2018). All 
religions report that the vast majority of their friends, relatives and neighbours are from 
the same religion (Hayes and McAllister, 2015 [2013]). Younger generations are display-
ing the same patterns as the general population, indicating that there is little evidence of 
change any time soon. As such, the idea that a contact thesis drives convergence does not 
hold when there is such limited contact between the two communities.
Another explanation may be that rising wealth has undermined the conflict divisions. 
Levels of wealth have certainly increased in Northern Ireland since the peace process and 
levels of unemployment have decreased for both communities. Gross Value Added per 
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capita for Northern Ireland increased from almost £12,000 in 1998 to just over £21,000 in 
2017 (ONS, 2018). Real household income also rose in the same period, increasing from 
an average of £9000 in 1998 to £15,800 in 2017 (NISRA, 2018). While unemployment 
rates for Protestants largely remained constant (5% in 1998; 4% in 2017), for Catholics 
they fell from 10% to 4% (The Executive Office, 2019). Yet, there is no reason to assume 
that increases in wealth reduce ethnic polarisation, especially given that inequality 
between the two communities remains complicated. Inequality has reduced with the 
expansion of a more affluent Catholic middle class, less labour market segregation and 
more social mobility. But 74 of the 100 most deprived super output areas (small statistical 
geographical areas) are majority Catholic (NISRA, 2017).3 Inequality between the two 
communities has reduced but still persists, so this is unlikely to mitigate levels potential 
polarisation caused by power-sharing. Furthermore, reductions in inequality are the direct 
effect of power-sharing’s institutional reforms rather than some separate force.
One significant factor that may well play an important role in encouraging convergence 
is the electoral system of PR-STV. In theory, this preferential system should create incen-
tives for parties to appeal to all voters in the hope of winning their lower transfers. In 
Northern Ireland there is some evidence of this happening. While candidates generally 
obtain the most transfers from other candidates in their party, there is also evidence of vot-
ers for moderate parties transferring to formerly extreme parties in their own block, namely, 
SDLP voters transferring to Sinn Féin and UUP voters transferring to the DUP. What is not 
evident is voters crossing the community divide to transfer their votes to historically 
extreme parties – both Sinn Féin and the DUP receive almost no votes from unionist or 
nationalist voters, respectively. Typically, this is also the case for the SDLP and the UUP, 
but since agreeing to form an official opposition and after appeals from their leaders to 
transfer votes, some evidence of unionists and nationalists transferring their votes across 
the divide to these parties was evident in 2017 (Barry, 2017). But given PR-STV works 
more within blocks, it does not explain the overall lack of polarisation between the blocks. 
What is more, the electoral system is an integral part of the overall power-sharing package 
and so its effect should be included in the effect of power-sharing on polarisation.
Explaining Northern Ireland’s Ambivalent Politics
If, as we argue, power-sharing does not entrench differences or increase polarisation, this 
raises the question of how we explain the ongoing salience of difficult identity politics 
despite its relative lack of emphasis by the parties and the electorate? There may well be 
no polarisation in the sense that critics would predict, but there can be no denying that the 
Assembly has been suspended four times, it collapsed as recently as January 2017 until 
January 2020, and Northern Ireland struggles to deal with the past.
We suggest this is best explained by the strategies adopted by the parties in an effort to 
differentiate themselves from their electoral rivals: in a system of overall convergence, 
parties are attempting to differentiate themselves on the ethno-national cleavage while 
simultaneously compromising on other issues. Such an explanation resonates with earlier 
findings around electoral behaviour (Mitchell et al., 2009) and post-conflict cleavages 
(Tilley et al., 2019). This, we suggest, is independent of the effects of power-sharing. As 
Chandra (2006) argues, ethnic identities may not be that different from other political 
identities and often ethnic identities are viewed by parties as a way to position themselves 
within the electorate. In such instances, ethnic identities are not ideologically driven 
exogenous entities that polarise a society around deeply antagonist and exclusive 
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identities, but rather it is deploying them instrumentally for electoral gains. If this is the 
case, then identity politics may well be more flexible and less polarised than would be 
expected. As Manning (2019) has shown, former rebels turned political parties will con-
tinue to emphasise a civil war cleavage in the post–civil war period if it gives them elec-
toral advantages, but not necessarily if it does not (Manning, 2019). This fits with the 
transformation of the radical parties in Northern Ireland, which saw them compromise on 
core issues and embrace reformist politics even while retaining their competing goals of 
a united Ireland or remaining within the Union (Tonge et al., 2014; Whiting, 2018b).
In the crowded electoral space of post 1998 Northern Ireland, and with rigid block 
voting, electoral differentiation became the key to success. Under these conditions, Sinn 
Féin and the DUP made clear commitments to the peace process, but also played up to 
their historically hardline image in an effort to be seen as the strongest protector of that 
identity (Mitchell et al., 2009). This did not lead to polarisation and Northern Ireland’s 
historic rivals are often cooperative with each other even if not always warm. Rather, 
identities are used instrumentally, albeit circling around an unchanged ethno-national 
ideological core, and so flexible enough to accommodate while still playing up to hard-
line images (Whiting, 2018b).
Perhaps the major factor that pushes instrumental identity politics to the brink despite 
the lack of actual polarisation lies in the moral hazard created by Westminster’s manage-
ment of Northern Ireland. As a guarantor of the peace process, the British role has largely 
been to oversee it from a distance without interfering. However, any time it looked in 
jeopardy, successive governments under Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron 
showed themselves willing to grant political or financial concessions (often at the urging 
of the government in Dublin and local parties). This, we suggest, meant that the local par-
ties could engage in brinkmanship knowing a safety net of concessions was usually avail-
able. In other words, pushing the system to the point of collapse was strategic rather than 
down to ideological polarisation.
The support given to Sinn Féin during the peace process is well documented, including 
political support from the British and Irish governments and financial support from Irish-
America. Even in the long drawn out process of decommissioning and winning the sup-
port of the DUP, the British government combined incentives (like devolving justice 
powers and tax rates) with disincentives (withholding salaries and passing unpopular 
policies from Westminster) (Hain, 2012). Blair personally offered amnesties to IRA mem-
bers ‘on the run’ to secure their support for devolution. Even as late as 2014 under 
Cameron’s premiership, when the Assembly came close to collapse over legacy issues 
and symbolic politics, the Westminster government initially said further support was off 
the table before changing its position. The result was the Fresh Start Agreement for 
Northern Ireland (2015) and additional funding for the region to offset the costs of wel-
fare reform being imposed throughout the United Kingdom. Even though Theresa May 
initially appeared less willing to follow this path, ultimately her government became reli-
ant on the DUP in a confidence and supply agreement in 2017 and again more financial 
support was given to the region. These are only some brief examples, but the point is that 
when Northern Ireland reached a crisis point, the British government typically offered 
political concessions or financial benefits. Northern Irish parties do not necessarily have 
to suffer the consequences of the positions they adopt, instead blame shifting onto each 
other and onto Westminster while waiting for a rescue package. Where the trade-off lies 
between providing external support to a power-sharing settlement but avoiding moral 
hazard clearly requires further research.
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Finally, it is possible that the idea of a large distance between the parties is the product 
of media portrayals rather than a reflection of reality. Murtagh (2015) found that candi-
dates from non-ethnic parties believed that media depictions remained locked in an 
‘Orange vs Green’ narrative and their coverage perpetuated this. Looking to evidence 
outside Northern Ireland, it has been found that media coverage of polarisation increases 
beliefs that the electorate is polarised (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016). It has also been 
argued that the media has an economic incentive to cater to partisan audiences, thus 
increasing the sense of polarisation, even if the median ideology is centrist (Bernhardt 
et al., 2008). This is perhaps highlighted by the 2017 Assembly and Westminster elec-
tions, which were widely portrayed as polarising ones. These elections came soon after 
the Assembly had collapsed amid the DUP’s mismanagement of a renewable heating 
scheme and increased tension over the Irish language, and the Belfast Telegraph described 
the results as representing the new Balkanization of Northern Irish politics (O’Doherty, 
2017). While we could not analyse the 2017 manifestos, our other data on elite speeches 
and mass attitudes indicate no great rise in polarisation at this time and, in fact, we found 
increased convergence and a rising vote share for other parties. Clearly, further research 
on media portrayals compared to empirical realities is needed to see how these may shape 
a sense of post-conflict polarisation.
Conclusion
Using a more careful understanding of polarisation, the case of Northern Ireland demon-
strates that criticisms that power-sharing pulls parties apart may need to be rethought. 
This case has important lessons for elsewhere. It shows the value of developing a more 
expanded understanding of polarisation. Existing conceptualizations are overly static and 
one-dimensional. Our conceptualisation sees polarisation as multi-dimensional and 
accepts that political systems may be polarised in some issue areas while not being so in 
others. It also sees this as a dynamic process and, by tracing this over time, it is able to 
test for bipolarisation as well as whether a system has actually become polarised or not. 
Finally, it shows the value of looking to both the elite and the mass level. We also demon-
strate a way to operationalise this conceptualisation by drawing on a range of empirical 
measures that tap into different aspects of elite and mass behaviour and preferences. Such 
a method is potentially transferable to other post-conflict settings.
We are not so bold as to claim that the pattern seen in Northern Ireland will be repro-
duced in every power-sharing setting. Context matters when it comes to the success or 
failure of power-sharing (Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015), and the streets of Belfast are very 
different than those of Baghdad. Nonetheless, Northern Ireland is a useful pathway case 
for this debate. If polarisation fails to emerge even in a hard case of consociational power-
sharing with a history of entrenched divisions and very high segregation, then this is a vital 
lesson for elsewhere. At the very least, Northern Ireland implies that the entrenchment and 
increase in the political divisions under power-sharing is not what may be expected and 
any effort to posit a link between the two needs to be carefully documented and explored.
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1. A further normative criticism is that power-sharing rewards rebels for using violence (Jarstad, 2008), but 
that is beyond our focus here.
2. We have only listed the parties that we cover in this article. However, it is worth noting the presence of 
smaller parties too, such as the Traditional Unionist Voice in the ‘unionist’ designation and People Before 
Profit and the Green Party in the ‘other’ designation.
3. We would like to thank one of the reviewers for this analysis.
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